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To his credit, Nowell Smith is explicit 
in the final chapter that Heidegger’s 
reflections on poetry are often fraught 
with internal contradictions. Nowell 
Smith “reads Heidegger against him-
self ” in the context of several poems 
about which Heidegger offers remarks, 
such as George’s “In stillste ruh.” These 
contradictions call attention to the fact 
that poetry remains beyond the limits 
of thought and thus is deeply resistant 
to conclusive philosophical analysis. 
Most importantly, they constitute a 
compelling defense of Nowell Smith’s 
primary thesis that poetic form engages 
thought—specifically, the thought of 
Heidegger—as its other. In the end, 
Nowell Smith’s work holds together as an 
attempt to bring thought to an encoun-
ter with its own limit so as to prepare 
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In her most recent book, Epistemic 
Authority, Linda Zagzebski provides a 
way of thinking about rationality, trust, 
and authority that many communi-
ties—both religious and non-religious, 
but especially Catholics—will find fits 
naturally with their considered commit-
ments. It’s worth your time to give it a 
careful read.
The roots of Epistemic Authority 
reach down into Enlightenment de-
bates about intellectual autonomy, self-
reliance, and egalitarianism, and more 
recently the work of William Alston 
and Richard Foley on intellectual trust 
in oneself and others. Zagzebski retraces 
those debates in the first two chapters, 
but she intends to offer us something 
new as the book’s “trunk”: a model of 
rationality and a novel argument for 
intellectual self-trust to rescue us from 
the maelstrom of epistemic circularity 
(chapter 2), and an argument to extend 
that trust to others (chapter 3). The 
remaining chapters are the “branches” 
of the tree: extensions and developments 
of her core arguments into fruitful dis-
cussions of trust in emotions (chapter 
4), trust in authority (chapter 5), the 
authority of testimony (chapter 6), 
authority in communities (chapter 7), 
moral authority (chapter 8), religious 
authority (chapter 9), and the epistemol-
ogy of disagreement (chapter 10).
Let’s take a closer look at that trunk. 
Here, Zagzebski puts great weight on 
the dissonance we feel when our beliefs, 
emotions, desires, and decisions conflict 
with one another. This is an indicator 
of irrationality, she says. Her example: 
I believe that I turned off the watering 
system, but then I hear the sprinklers go 
on. Conflict. Unease. And yet harmony is 
naturally and automatically restored by 
giving up that belief. She says:
“What we do automatically gives 
us our initial standard of rationality, 
a standard for what it is to make the 
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adjustment in the self correctly. The 
criterion works only if there is a close 
connection between the way the self 
naturally operates and what the self 
ought to do . . . between the natural and 
the normative . . . between the self as it 
naturally operates and the way it should 
operate” (32).
This initial standard of rationality 
would feel at home in any virtue episte-
mology. As for a final standard, Zagzebski 
proposes conscientious self-reflection: “Our 
second model of rationality is what we 
do when dissonance is not resolved and 
we reflect on it. When I do that, I will 
attempt to target the belief that should be 
given up, and to that end I will ask myself 
which beliefs are more likely to satisfy 
my future self-reflection” (217). On her 
view, that connection between the 
natural and the normative is tightened 
further when we’re conscientious. And, 
so, we arrive at this final standard of ra-
tionality, which serves as the cornerstone 
premise in all the main arguments of 
Zagzebski’s book:
“Rationality Is Natural.” In any 
case of cognitive dissonance, so long as 
I resolve the conflict in favor of what 
I trust when I am being epistemically 
conscientious—when I do a better, more 
conscientious job of what I do naturally, 
automatically—then I have resolved the 
conflict rationally.
It’s fairly clear how the argument 
for the rationality of self-trust goes 
from here. The problem is that we can-
not know that our faculties are reliable 
without using them (to check their 
reliability), and we cannot reasonably 
use them (says the skeptic) until we 
know they are reliable. And so we’re 
seemingly caught in a loop, with no 
rational escape. By way of solution, 
Zagzebski says: “Reflective self-trust 
resolves the dissonance we have when 
we discover epistemic circularity, and 
that seems to me to be rational” (43). 
Contra the skeptic, it is rational to trust 
our faculties, Zagzebski thinks, even 
without independent evidence of their 
reliability. For self-trust is something we 
do naturally and conscientiously. So, 
by the Rationality is Natural principle, 
self-trust is rational. Furthermore, “it 
is natural to believe what other people 
tell me” (38); that too I do when I am 
being epistemically conscientious. From 
there via Rationality is Natural we could 
directly reach the conclusion that trust 
in others is rational as well. (Though, 
instead of using these resources already 
at hand, Zagzebski extends self-trust to 
trust in others via a “treat like cases alike” 
premise. We’re not sure why she added 
this epicycle.)
Much of the rest of the book is de-
voted to pointing out other things we 
do naturally in order to show—leaning 
more each time on Rationality is Natu-
ral—that those things are also rational. 
For example, trust in emotions, testi-
mony, authority (including moral and 
religious authorities), and the occasional 
steadfast self-trust even in the face of peer 
disagreement. This, in a sketch, is Zag-
zebski’s project in Epistemic Authority. 
We’ll now offer some friendly concerns 
about its prospects.
First, Rationality is Natural brings 
to mind Aristotle’s function argument 
for virtue ethics, and all its problems. 
Aristotle’s jump from proper function 
oughts to moral oughts is perilous, and 
we believe similar perils await those 
who wish to move from what’s natural 
to what’s rational. For couldn’t there 
be irrational resolutions of dissonance, 
resolutions that come naturally to us 
even when we’re being conscientious? 
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Surely there are. Consider well-known 
cognitive biases, for example the gam-
bler’s fallacy: we expect a fair coin to 
come up heads only 50 percent of the 
time, but we observe five heads in a 
row. Dissonance. Humans—even con-
scientious humans—often naturally (but 
irrationally) conclude that the next flip 
is less than 50 percent likely to come 
up heads. Also, humans are ingenious 
at post-hoc rationalization, for ex-
ample rationalization after an expensive 
purchase. Our commitment conflicts 
with all the contrary considerations. 
Tension. We naturally (and irrationally) 
silence those contrary considerations, 
amplify the considerations in favor of 
our commitment, and misjudge the 
well-groundedness of our commitment. 
(And notice that post-hoc rationalization 
requires that we be conscientious and 
self-reflective.) Often, despite our best 
efforts, our conscientious self-reflection 
leads us into irrationality. We have many 
cognitive blind spots. This, obviously, is a 
problem for Rationality is Natural. And 
that principle, recall, is a crucial premise 
in all of Zagzebski’s main arguments in 
Epistemic Authority. (Though Zagzebski 
discusses cognitive biases in chapter 11, 
she lumps them in with attempts to 
debunk self-trust, and does not consider 
them as potential counterexamples to 
Rationality is Natural.)
Our second concern is that Ra-
tionality is Natural has implausible 
implications for the epistemology of 
disagreement. The debate there turns 
on the puzzle of contrary intuitions in 
apparently analogous cases. In some 
cases we think conciliation is obviously 
called for, e.g., when you think your 
share of the bill is $ 38 but your dinner 
companion thinks it’s $ 42, you ought 
to lower your confidence in your initial 
answer. In others, we think steadfastness 
is obviously called for: most of us main-
tain confidence in our cherished politi-
cal, moral, religious, and philosophical 
beliefs even in the face of disagreement. 
In order to avoid treating all these ap-
parently similar cases similarly—thereby 
recommending implausible steadfastness 
in cases like the restaurant check or un-
palatable spinelessness in the others—we 
must find some relevant dissimilarity, 
a principled reason to treat these cases 
differently.
But, with her project built around 
Rationality is Natural, Zagzebski can 
provide us with no such principle to 
steer between the Scylla of spineless 
skepticism and the Charybdis of dog-
matic steadfastness. In fact, her view of 
rationality manages to run us into both, 
by licensing any response to disagree-
ment so long as it’s a result of an agent’s 
conscientious self-reflection. She writes: 
“Disagreement with people we conscien-
tiously judge to be conscientious should 
be handled . . . in a way that we conscien-
tiously judge will survive conscientious 
self-reflection” (215). And later: “I am 
reasonable when I resolve the conflict 
in favor of what I trust the most when 
I am being epistemically conscientious” 
(219). In slogan form: Try your best, get 
a trophy.
This is a consistent application of 
Rationality is Natural to the epistemol-
ogy of disagreement. But the results 
are ruinous, as illustrated by this story: 
Smith, Brown, and Jones are locked in 
a disagreement. Smith is a marvel at 
math, Brown is mediocre, and Jones is 
terrible. Smith and Jones know all this, 
but Brown mistakenly thinks they’re all 
peers at math. They disagree over how to 
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split their restaurant check into thirds, 
arriving at three moderately different 
answers. They share their answers and 
their justifications with one another. 
Though she’s a math wizard (and, in-
deed, arrives at the correct answer), 
Smith is inordinately cautious. She sees 
the errors in Brown’s and Jones’s reason-
ing processes, but she second-guesses 
herself and conscientiously chooses to 
be conciliatory toward their answers, 
substantially lowering her confidence 
in her own (correct) answer, perhaps 
settling on the average of all three an-
swers. (Maybe you worry that Smith, 
seeing Brown’s and Jones’s errors, could 
not lower her confidence because that’s 
psychologically impossible. But one 
may well see something and doubt that 
he does, if for example he thinks he’s 
the victim of hallucination or illusion. 
If you admit Smith psychologically can 
be conciliatory here but insist that she 
cannot do so conscientiously since that’s 
clearly irrational, recall that Zagzebski 
means to analyze rationality in terms of 
conscientiousness—to explain the nor-
mative in terms of the natural—and not 
vice versa on pain of circularity.) Though 
Jones is terrible at math and knows 
it, she makes up for that shortcoming 
with a self-confident, cavalier attitude. 
She conscientiously chooses steadfast-
ness, disregarding Smith’s and Brown’s 
answers though she can’t find fault with 
them. By contrast, Brown trusts her 
answer, but she also trusts Smith and 
Jones, sees that they disagree with her, 
and can find no fault with their proofs. 
Dissonance. She tries her best but can’t 
resolve the dissonance. She’s stuck, vacil-
lating among various credences, unsure 
where to land.
Now here’s the point of that story. 
We find it obvious that Smith—the 
self-recognized expert—was irrational to 
be conciliatory. And we find it obvious 
that Jones—the self-recognized math-
ematical lightweight—was irrational 
to be steadfast. Brown is the best of the 
bunch; her performance was the most 
rational response to this disagreement. 
But Zagzebski disagrees on all three 
points. On Zagzebski’s view, Smith 
and Jones are both rational, since they 
conscientiously resolved the conflict 
(Smith, by discounting her own rea-
soning and averaging her answer with 
her friends’; Jones, by disregarding her 
friends’ answers). Yet Brown does not 
come out as rational on Zagzebski’s view, 
since Brown failed to harmonize the 
dissonance. Worse, since Zagzebski says 
dissonance is an indicator of irrationality, 
Brown’s unresolved dissonance indicates 
irrationality, on her view. And, so, we 
conclude that Zagzebski’s contribution 
to the epistemology of disagreement 
gives us three wrong results, results that 
easily could be multiplied. We find no 
principle here by which we might defuse 
those apparently conflicting intuitions 
that form the central puzzle of the epis-
temology of disagreement. Indeed, the 
principle on offer in Epistemic Authority 
makes that puzzle worse.
Nevertheless, Epistemic Authority 
is an excellent foundation for anyone 
who wishes to become acquainted with 
the history of these puzzles, and a valu-
able contribution to the literature that 
deserves our conscientious reflection. 
Go read it.
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